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celand has developed an oversized banking 
system – with assets valued at 8 times its GDP 
– which has effectively transformed the 
country into a hedge fund. Domestic banks have 
borrowed heavily abroad to buy foreign banking 
assets, leveraging their capital base several times 
over. As a bust is following the global boom in the 
banking sector, the country is highly exposed to the 
current crisis. The lender of last resort in Iceland 
would not be able to save even one of the large 
domestic banks should write downs in the value of 
foreign assets bring any one of them into 
difficulties. Other European countries with 
financial centres have either avoided becoming 
lender of last resort for their banks (Luxembourg) 
or accumulated large foreign assets as a cushion 
(Switzerland).  By contrast, Iceland’s  extremely 
high net foreign debt ratio adds to the vulnerability 
of the country, which thus resembles a hedge fund 
with negative capital. 
Moreover, Iceland has experienced a 
construction/housing boom even more extreme than 
in the US or the one now ending in Spain. 
This exposes the country to the classical 
combination of an exchange rate cum banking 
crisis coupled with a long real estate bust. 
Exchange rate devaluation can provide only limited 
compensation for the housing construction bust 
that seems unavoidable because Iceland is a rather 
closed economy, with manufacturing exports 
accounting for less than 10% of GDP. 
Introduction 
For small financially active countries the exchange 
rate assumes particular importance, not only as a 
shock absorber, but potentially also as a source of 
shocks during financial market crises. This is very 
much in evidence today in the case of Iceland 
which is being hit hard by the recent turbulence in 
financial markets.  
In March of 2008, the Icelandic Central Bank was 
forced to increase interest rates to unprecedented 
levels in an effort to stem a rapid depreciation of 
the currency. This raises the question of whether 
the authorities in the special case of Iceland would 
have eliminated one source of shock to the 
economy and thus helped to stabilize the currency 
if it had abandoned the national currency. 
Euro area members, including Luxembourg, which 
is also home to large internationally active banks, 
have so far been spared the worst effects of the 
ongoing ‘subprime’ crisis. But this positive 
experience of member countries of the euro area 
might not be relevant for Iceland since its economy 
differs in some key aspects from that of the 
‘average’ euro area member – and even that of 
Luxembourg, as will be documented below. 
The prime example of a country adopting the euro 
outside the euro area is Montenegro. The euro in 
Montenegro has been a success so far. Even the 
European institutions (especially the ECB), which 
were very hostile at the start, have now come to the 
conclusion that Montenegro should keep this 
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arrangement for the time being. Montenegro is also 
a very small state (with a population of ± 600,000) 
but it offers few lessons (except that unilateral 
euroisation is technically feasible) for Iceland 
because it practically did not have any banking 
system and was not integrated in the global 
financial system. 
Iceland has two features that distinguish it from 
most euro area members (apart from size): its 
limited degree of trade integration and the 
extraordinary degree of financial integration. Both 
features are relevant for the choice of an exchange 
rate regime. On both counts joining the euro should 
be advantageous for Iceland. 
In short the argument would be that adopting the 
euro should stimulate trade. Moreover, adopting the 
euro could avoid large shocks that arise from the 
mixture of very large onshore and offshore banking 
activities in domestic banks, which have become 
‘too big to be saved’. However, it is also clear that 
the choice of the currency cannot affect the 
fundamental problem of Iceland, namely that the 
country as such is highly exposed to the 
international banking market. Whatever the choice 
of the currency, living standards in Iceland will 
have to adjust to the real value of the banking 
assets bought in recent years.  
The remainder of this note elaborates on these two 
points keeping in mind that the most useful 
comparator countries for Iceland are Luxembourg, 
Switzerland and Cyprus, all of which have very 
large financial systems and share a high degree of 
financial integration. So far it seems that 
Luxembourg, which is a member of the eurozone, 
is the most successful. 
1. Real openness 
The main economic argument for euro area 
membership has always been that it facilitates 
commerce.
1 Recent research indicates that this has 
indeed been the case, but the effects are only now 
slowly building up.  
For Iceland the limited degree of trade integration 
suggests that the static gain from eliminating 
transaction costs on trade might be limited, but the 
potential dynamic gain from an increase in trade 
                                                      
1  The fiscally weaker member countries had an 
additional reason to join EMU, namely to forestall 
potential speculative attacks and participate in the 
credibility of the new institution (itself based initially on 
that of the Bundesbank). Given its very strong fiscal 
position (essentially zero public debt) and the high 
quality of its strong institutions in general, Iceland 
would also not need to import the credibility of the ECB. 
integration might be very large. Despite its small 
size Iceland has a smaller trade/GDP ratio than 
Germany or many other EU member countries. It is 
possible that euro area membership might lead to a 
quantum change in the degree of trade integration, 
as predicted by a large body of research, but 
progress in terms of trade integration within the 
eurozone itself has in reality been gradual. 
The tables below show that both in terms of the 
importance of trade (for both imports and exports) 
and the composition of trade, Iceland is relatively 
closed relative to its size. Exports of manufacturing 
goods in particular seem to be very small relative to 
its comparators. 
Table 1a. Iceland’s import boom (% of GDP) 
  1995 2000  2006 
Imports of consumption 
goods   8.8 8.6  9.8 
Imports of capital & 
consumption goods   13.4 15.4  20.3 
Imports of capital goods   4.6  6.8  10.5 
Imports of intermediate 
goods   11.5 11.9  16.4 
Imports   24.9  27.3  36.7 
Source: UN trade database. 
An often commented feature of the Icelandic 
economy is its large trade deficit, which is mainly 
due to the surge of capital goods imports in 2006. 
However, most of this is destined for the 
construction of an aluminum smelter, which will 
export most of its production. Hence, the 2000 data 
give a better idea of the degree of import 
penetration of Iceland, which for its size was rather 
low in 2000, at around 27% of GDP. Table 1b 
provides a comparison with Germany, which shows 
that despite the huge differences in size, Germany 
is, on most measures, more open to imports than 
Iceland. 
1b. Germany and Iceland: Comparing degrees of 
openness (% of GDP) 
 
Imports of 
intermediate goods   Total Imports 
  1995 2006 1995 2006 
Germany  20.0 18.5 30.4 30.8 
Iceland  11.5 16.4 24.9 36.7 
Source: Ameco. 
More importantly, Iceland stands out even more in 
its extraordinarily low level of exports. The export-
to-GDP ratio is much below the average euro area 
member country, and only a fraction of the smaller 
euro area countries, or that of Switzerland (also 
financially active) or even that of Germany, as 
shown in Table 1c.  Iceland on the brink? | 3 
Table 1c. How important are exports?(% of GDP) 
  Goods 
Goods and 
services 
  1995 2007 1995  2007 
Iceland 26.0  20.4  35.5  35.6 
        
Germany 8.5  14.4  24.0  46.6 
Cyprus 1.8  2.1  50.0  46.8 
Luxembourg 4.8  5.6  106.4  172.0 
Switzerland 25.7  38.1  35.9  54.7 
Source: AMECO. 
Table 1d shows that especially in terms of exports 
of manufacturing goods, Iceland (which amount to 
less than 9% of GDP) is a rather closed economy. 
The distinction between manufacturing goods and 
other, resource-based goods, is important because 
the supply of the latter is really not influenced by 
domestic wage and cost elements. An adjustment in 
the real exchange rate can stimulate the economy 
mainly by making domestically manufactured 
goods more competitive on the world market. 
However, this mechanism seems to be less 
important in Iceland than one would expect given 
the small size of the economy. For Germany, 
Luxembourg and Switzerland, exports of 
manufacturing goods are more than three times as 
important. Only Cyprus has an even lower export 
ratio for manufacturing goods, but Cyprus exports 
mainly services (tourism) to an extent that could 
never be replicated in Iceland. 
Table 1d. The importance of manufacturing exports 
(% of GDP) 
 1995  2006 
Iceland 5.7  8.6 
    
Germany 19.0  33.5 
Cyprus 5.9  4.2 
Luxembourg   29.0 
Switzerland 24.6  34.0 
Source: UN trade database. 
2. Financial integration 
The most remarkable feature of Iceland’s economy 
in recent years has been the explosion of financial 
openness. In a very short period of time Iceland 
seems to have reached the level of Switzerland (on 
a per capita basis) as shown in the table below. For 
Luxembourg, the gross foreign investment 
positions would be an order of magnitude larger, 
but this would be a misleading comparison given 
the special ‘offshore’ nature of its banking system. 
Table 2. Net foreign investment positions ($ billion) 
 Iceland  Switzerland 
 2000  2006  Change  2006 
Scaled 
to size 
of ISL 
Net FDI  0.2  5.7  5.5  314.1  9.5 
Net PI  -1.9  -37.8  -35.9  119.1  3.6 
Net PI Eq  2.1  7.9  5.8 
-
262.5  -8.0 
Net PI debt  -4.0  -45.7  -41.7  381.6  11.6 
Net banks  -2.0  14.6  16.6  -55.1  -1.7 
Net other  -1.3  -4.0  -2.7     
          
Net IIP  -5.3  -19.5  -14.1  459.2  13.9 
Source: IMF, IFS. 
The key difference between Switzerland and 
Iceland is that, on a per capita basis, Switzerland 
has accumulated a surplus position that is 
equivalent in size (close to one full year of GDP) to 
Iceland’s net debtor position. Moreover, Icelandic 
banks have issued a total of over $40 billion in debt 
securities in the last few years of which ‘only’ $14 
billion were needed to finance the cumulative 
current account surpluses since 2000, with the 
remaining funds (around $28 billion) used to 
finance foreign equity acquisitions (about $11 
billion) and $17 billion in banking assets abroad. 
One concern about large gross foreign asset and 
liabilities positions is that the reported returns 
might be variable and thus distort the measured 
current account. However, this does not seem to be 
the case for Iceland since the reported rates of 
return (calculated as investment income divided by 
the gross position) all seem reasonable. On 
average, Iceland pays an interest rate of about 7% 
on its net foreign debt. 
Table 3. Rates of return on foreign assets and 
liabilities of Iceland 
 2006 
Assets 3.8% 
Liabilities -4.7% 
NIIP (net/net)  7.4% 
Source: IMF, IFS. 
3.  Consequences of financial openness 
3.1 Shift in sources of foreign exchange 
earnings-outlays  
One implication of the foreign financial activities 
of Icelandic firms is that the importance of 
‘normal’ exports of goods and services as key 
sources of foreign exchange income (and outlays) 
has diminished rapidly in recent years. Since 4 | Daniel Gros 
investment income does not respond to the 
exchange rate, this implies that movements of the 
exchange rate have a relatively smaller influence 
on the current account, and that larger movements 
might be required to adjust to shocks (whether to 
investment income or just to the availability of 
foreign capital). 
The tables below show this for Iceland and provide 
a comparison with three European economies that 
are also engaged in global financial activism. It is 
apparent that the financial sector is even more 
important in Luxembourg, but Iceland seems to 
have surpassed Cyprus and reached the level of 
Switzerland. 
Table 4a. Evolution in the structure of foreign 
exchange sources in Iceland 
 
Foreign exchange 
earnings 
Foreign ex-
change outlays 
 1999  2006  1999  2006 
Goods 65.5  45  64  47 
Services 30.3  24  28  21 
Investment 
income  4.2 31 
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Table 4b. Distribution of foreign exchange 
earnings (2006): A comparison 
 ISL  CH  LUX  CY 
Goods 45  51  10  14 
Services 24  16  31  77 
Investment 
income 31  33  59 
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Table 4c. Percent distribution of foreign exchange 
outlays (2006) 
 ISL  CH  LUX  CY 
Goods 47  63  13  57 
Services 21  11  19  29 
Investment 
income  32 26  68 
 
14 
Source: IMF, IFS. 
3.2 Lender of last resort responsibility for the 
banking sector 
One key aspect of the stability of a banking system 
is the credibility of the lender of last resort (lolr). 
Under normal circumstances, this not an issue 
because the public institutions that provide this 
function (either central banks or national treasuries) 
have deep pockets compared to the size of any 
individual bank. In an economy that functions as a 
global financial centre, however, this might no 
longer be the case. For example, the Swiss National 
Bank is increasingly concerned that the cost of 
support for the large global Swiss Banks might be 
beyond its capacity. 
In Luxembourg, where the banking sector is even 
larger (compared to the local economy), the 
problem does not arise because the Luxembourg 
authorities have always insisted that the 
subsidiaries of foreign banks have a clear owner 
that is also a bank so that the home country remains 
the lolr.  
Liechtenstein has retained responsibility for 
lending of last resort, but has a special arrangement 
with the Swiss National Bank in order to be able to 
dispose of Swiss francs, its national currency.  
In Cyprus the main foreign financial activity is not 
via banks, but investment via Cyprus-domiciled 
enterprises that take advantage of existing 
favourable double-taxation treaties to re-cycle 
savings from Russia and other Eastern European 
countries.  
How large is the risk for the lender of last resort? 
One indicator of the risk is the loan-deposit ratio 
because it indicates to what extent banks depend on 
sources other than (usually very stable) deposits to 
finance their business. Given the large size of the 
Icelandic banking system it might not be useful to 
compare it to other large OECD countries, but 
Iceland constitutes an outlier even among financial 
centres such as Switzerland or Luxembourg. 
Table 5. Loan-deposit ratios 
 ISL  CH  LUX 
2007/11 3.42  2.22  0.52 
2003/11 1.93  1.04  0.48 
Source: IMF banking statistics. 
Given that banks everywhere are facing problems 
at present in raising funds on the capital markets, 
this extreme dependency of Icelandic banks on the 
capital market constitutes a potentially very serious 
problem. There might not be a short problem à la 
Northern Rock, since Icelandic banks have secured 
sufficient long-term financing and stand-by 
facilities for the coming year, but in the longer term 
the risk remains. 
4.  Has financial integration paid off? 
The growth record so far 
The special feature of the Icelandic economy that 
dominates all other aspects is the (recent) explosion 
of global financial activity. This is why one has to 
compare Iceland to the other European countries 
with large financial sectors: Luxembourg and 
Switzerland. Cyprus can also provide a useful Iceland on the brink? | 5 
comparison since it also has a population only 
twice that of Iceland, but as a recent member 
country and an even more recent member of the 
euro area, it is difficult to draw already any 
conclusions. 
Since Switzerland is not in the eurozone, it is also 
difficult to draw direct lessons from the its 
experience, but a triangular comparison (ISL, LUX, 
CH) might be useful. In short it seems that 
Luxembourg has in the medium term benefited 
strongly from euro area membership, performing 
much better than Switzerland since the euro’s 
launch.  
Financial centres or economies with a very large 
globally active financial sector face the problem of 
how to insulate the domestic economy, which 
depends on regular flows of production of goods 
and services, from the large shocks that might 
come from shifts in the values of the stock of assets 
and liabilities in the financial sector. In 
Luxembourg this problem has been resolved by 
joining the eurozone and making the banking 
system offshore. (Cyprus has recently made the 
decision regarding the currency). In Switzerland 
the domestic economy has so far been large enough 
to absorb the shocks in the financial sphere, and the 
national currency has been managed, de facto, very 
tightly. Moreover, the country has consistently run 
large current account deficits, providing an extra 
cushion. 
How have these three economies performed over 
the last decade? In terms of GDP per capita (at 
purchasing power parity) Luxembourg has grown 
far more strongly than either Iceland or 
Switzerland, both of which seem to be in relative 
decline. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ameco. 
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5.  Housing/construction boom 
Iceland has recently experienced a housing boom, 
which does not seem to have an equivalent 
anywhere else among OECD countries. Two 
figures below provide a graphic description of the 
phenomenon. 
Figure 3 shows that the overall construction 
investment has now reached 20% of GDP, which 
is almost twice the value of the US and higher 
even than the value reached by Spain (18% of 
GDP).  
It might be argued that part of the construction 
activity in Iceland will create productive capacity 
for the export sector (hydro-electricity capacity 
coupled with aluminum smelters). Hence one 
might want to look at investment in housing alone 
to measure the extent of the real estate boom. 
However, even on this metric, the boom in 
Iceland beats all records. Investment in dwellings 
is still close to 11% of GDP, which is almost 
twice the US value and much higher than the 
Spanish value (which is the highest among the 
euro area countries). See Figure 4. Since 
investment in housing has been above the norm 
required for an essentially stable population for 
some time, it follows that a substantial housing 
overhang is likely to have been built up. The 
coming housing slump thus promises to be long 
and deep – as in the case of Germany whose 
values are also shown for purposes of comparison.  
The loss of domestic demand from the 
construction sector alone could easily amount to 
10% of GDP over the next few years. This will be 
difficult to compensate for with exports, given 
that manufacturing exports amount only to less 
than 10% of GDP, as documented in Table 1d 
above. These exports (the only ones that respond 
to the exchange rate) would have to double if the 
adjustment to the unavoidable retrenchment in the 
construction sector is not to leave to a large drop 
in demand and GDP. 
Sweden during the 1990s constitutes a similar 
case: housing investment had also been increasing 
in that country until the early 1990s. However, 
when the crisis broke, the currency had to be 
devalued massively and interest rates rose to 
extremely high levels and the banking system was 
under intensive stress. As a result housing 
investment fell from over 6% of GDP (still far 
below the current value for Iceland) to less than 
2% of GDP. See Figures 5 and 6.
2 
                                                      
2 The busts in Scandinavia (not only in Sweden as 
discussed, but also in Finland and Denmark) during the 
1990s were sharper, but also shorter than the real 
estate-induced slowdowns in Germany (post-1995 and 
Japan (since 1990). For more details, see Daniel Gros 
(2008),  Bubbles in real estate? A Longer-Term 
Comparative Analysis of Housing Prices in Europe 
and the US, CEPS WD No. 276, CEPS, Brussels. 
Figure 2. GDP (PPS per capita) 
Source: European Commission.
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Source: Ameco. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ameco. 
 
 
Figure 3. Investment in construction (% of GDP) 
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Figure 5. Investment in dwellings  
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Figure 6. Investment in constructions and dwellings in 2006 
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6.  Concluding remarks 
This note has argued that a priori the most useful 
comparators for Iceland should be other small 
economies with large and sophisticated financial 
sectors. Hence, Luxembourg (founding member of 
the eurozone), Switzerland (outside) and possibly 
Cyprus (recent eurozone member). However, 
Iceland differs even from these comparators 
because of its lower degree of trade integration, the 
concentration of its foreign financial activity in the 
banking sector (here Switzerland is most similar) 
and its very large foreign debt (unique). 
What do the special features of the Icelandic 
economy imply for the choice of the exchange rate 
system? 
The low degree of trade integration of Iceland 
might be related to the small size of the national 
currency area. Joining EMU might bring large 
dynamic benefits, but experience so far suggests 
that these benefits will take time to materialise. 
The high degree of financial integration in Iceland 
could be problematic and here the details matter. If 
the onshore and offshore parts of the banking 
system were neatly separated, fluctuations in the 
exchange rate might not be a cause for concern. 
However, the mixture of both elements, moreover 
concentrated in just three very large banks, creates 
a potential for serious problems. A particular 
reason for concern is that the correlation between 
the stock market (i.e. the market value of domestic 
banks) and the exchange rate is close to unity. The 
foreign activities of the banks now provide a large 
proportion of their profits. In principle, the euro 
value of these foreign profits should be 
independent of the exchange rate of the Krona 
against the euro. Hence the correlation between the 
stock market and the exchange rate should in 
principle be negative (this is why some banks 
would like to list their shares in euro). However, 
the strong positive correlation between the stock 
market and the external value of the krona suggests 
that in reality the market expects that a depreciation 
has a negative impact on bank profits. This could 
happen only through the one channel that always 
renders domestic lending in foreign currency 
problematic: when the exchange rate devalues, 
domestic enterprises have difficulty servicing their 
foreign exchange debt. 
The financial markets themselves thus suggest that 
exchange rate fluctuations might be an important 
source of shocks (rather than a shock absorber). 
This suggests that Iceland might want to follow the 
example of Luxembourg and Cyprus in opting for 
the euro, or it would have to clearly separate the 
onshore and offshore parts of its banking system. 
In going for the euro, Iceland would face the 
additional difficulty that it is particularly difficult at 
present to determine the appropriate exchange rate. 
The ongoing boom in the real estate sector is likely 
to have boosted domestic demand above the level 
sustainable in the long term. This suggests that a 
very large adjustment of the real exchange rate will 
be needed once the housing market turns. Germany 
experienced a much smaller construction boom 
after unification and, despite being a much more 
open economy than Iceland, it took ten years to 
digest the bust that followed that boom. 
While adopting the euro might be an optimal long-
term approach for Iceland, it is also clear that the 
country faces a fundamental problem that is 
independent of the choice of the exchange rate 
regime: Over the last few years, its banks have 
leveraged a relatively small capital base to buy up 
banking assets worth several times the country’s 
GDP. These assets were bought close to the height 
of the global credit and banking boom. Now that 
the boom has turned to a bust and banking assets 
have to be revalued everywhere, the key risk for the 
country is that these foreign banking assets will 
turn out to be worth much less than what Icelandic 
banks paid for them. If this scenario materialises, 
the country would incur an even larger foreign debt 
and the authorities might be called upon to save 
Icelandic banks from insolvency. As this would 
clearly overstretch the financial capacity of both 
the central bank and the ministry of finance, the 
best solution to this looming problem would be 
arrange for the sale of these banks, which are ‘too 
large to be rescued’ to foreign banks groups. The 
currency question could then be solved rather 
easily. 